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Abstract. We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents
may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are
allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties
from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness
and Pareto e‰ciency,we consider consistency and two solidarity properties
(replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases,
these properties are satisﬁed only by serially dictatorial rules.
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1. Introduction
We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may de-
sire more than one object and no monetary compensations are allowed. As an
example,one may think of a heritage consisting of indivisible objects ( e.g.,
furniture and household items) that has to be distributed among the heirs (e.g.,
the children of the deceased),respecting the wish that the objects should not
be sold but allocated. Since an agent may receive more than one object,one
could consider several interesting domains of preferences over sets of objects.
We consider four domains: the general domain of strict preferences,the do-
main of strict and separable preferences,the domain of strict,separable,and
responsive preferences,and the domain of strict and additive preferences.
* We wish to thank William Thomson,Sangkyu Rhee,and two anonymous referees for their
helpful comments and suggestions. We especially thank a referee,whose suggestion simpliﬁed the
proof of Theorem 1 considerably. All errors are our own responsibility.Pa ´pai (1998,2000a) studies essentially the same model,but considers the
general domain of strict preferences and monotonic preference domains.
Ehlers and Klaus (2000) study the same model and preference domains,but –
as we will discuss later – analyze di¤erent properties for allocation rules.
Recent studies have shown that when each agent may receive at most one
object,there exist some allocation rules,such as the core,that satisfy appeal-
ing properties; some of the most recent studies are Ehlers,Klaus,and Pa ´pai
(2000a, b),Ergin (2000),Miyagawa (2002),Pa ´pai (2000b),and Svensson
(1999). We demonstrate that the results di¤er considerably when we allow for
the consumption of multiple objects; in most cases,our list of properties are
satisﬁed only by serial dictatorships. By a serial dictatorship,we mean that
one agent chooses his best set of objects,then the second agent chooses his
best subset of the remaining set,then the third agent chooses,and so on,and
the order in which agents choose is ﬁxed in advance.
In situations when most or all of the objects are ‘‘good’’ for everyone,our
results might be regarded as negative since the ﬁrst dictator will consume most,
or all,of the ‘‘good’’ objects and leave few,or no,objects to the other agents.
However,when preferences are heterogeneous and objects are often ‘‘bad’’ for
some agents (possibly due to capacity constraints or satiation),serial dicta-
torships are widely applied and accepted. For example,used household items
sold or given away in garage sales are not ‘‘goods’’ for everyone. Often an
item is a ‘‘good’’ for some and a ‘‘bad’’ for others. Indeed,the allocation rule
used often in garage sales is the serial dictatorship where the order is deter-
mined on the ﬁrst-come,ﬁrst-served basis.
A practical advantage of serial dictatorships is that they are simple and
can be implemented easily and quickly. Furthermore,they are strategy-proof,
Pareto e‰cient,and satisfy other appealing properties discussed below. They
can be considered ‘‘fair’’ as well when the ordering of the agents is determined
fairly; for instance by queuing,seniority,or randomization (Abdulkadirog ˘lu
and So ¨nmez,1998,1999; Bogomolnaia and Moulin,1999).
We brieﬂy discuss the organization of the paper and our results. The model
is introduced in the next section. In Section 3,we ﬁrst show that for the two-
agent case, strategy-proofness and Pareto e‰ciency are satisﬁed only by serial
dictatorships (Theorem 1). Next,we consider the notion of minimal rights: an
agent with a minimal right for some object cannot be assigned a set of objects
that is worse for him than the object he has a minimal right for. We prove that
for the n-person case, strategy-proofness and Pareto e‰ciency exclude minimal
rights for more than one agent (Corollary 1). If we extend the model by as-
suming that the objects are initially owned by (or assigned to) agents,then the
latter result implies that strategy-proofness, Pareto e‰ciency,and individual-
rationality are incompatible – a result also obtained by So ¨nmez (1999).1
Ehlers and Klaus (2000) consider the stronger non-manipulation property
coalitional strategy-proofness (no group of agents ever gains by jointly mis-
representing their preferences). Their main result is that coalitional strategy-
proofness and Pareto e‰ciency only allow for sequential dictatorships; that is,
there exists a ﬁrst dictator who always chooses his best set of objects. Depend-
1 An earlier example of this type of impossibility is Hurwicz’s (1972) seminal result for exchange
economies: for two-agent two-good exchange economies,Hurwicz (1972) showed that,even on a
restricted domain that contains all translated Cobb-Douglas preferences,no allocation rule sat-
isﬁes strategy-proofness, Pareto e‰ciency,and individual-rationality.
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chooses his best subset of the remaining objects. Depending on the choices of
the previous dictators,a third dictator is determined,and so on. Pa ´pai (1998)
shows the same result on the domain of strict preferences.
In Section 4,we study two ‘‘solidarity properties’’: replacement-domination
and population-monotonicity. Replacement-domination says that if the prefer-
ences of an agent change,the welfare of the other agents is a¤ected in the
same direction; that is,either all of them (weakly) gain or all of them (weakly)
lose. We show (Theorem 2) that this solidarity property is not compatible with
Pareto e‰ciency. We also consider population-monotonicity,which is a similar
condition applied to the case when the set of agents varies. It requires that
if some agents leave the economy,the welfare of the remaining agents is af-
fected in the same direction. On the domain of strict and separable (or strict
and additive) preferences, population-monotonicity is compatible with both
strategy-proofness and Pareto e‰ciency. However,the three properties are
satisﬁed only by serial dictatorships (Theorem 3). On the other hand,these
three properties are not compatible on the general domain of strict preferences
(Corollary 2). Ehlers and Klaus (2000) prove that similar results can be ob-
tained if instead of population-monotonicity we consider the solidarity prop-
erty resource-monotonicity and strategy-proofness is strengthened to coalitional
strategy-proofness.
In Section 5,we discuss consistency,which is usually regarded as a condi-
tion of stability. On all of the preference domains we consider, consistency is
compatible with strategy-proofness and Pareto e‰ciency. Again,these proper-
ties are satisﬁed only by serial dictatorships (Theorem 4).
Finally,in Section 6,we prove the logical independence of the properties
used in the characterization results.
2. The model
There are kb2 objects,and the set of objects is denoted by K ¼f 1;2;...;kg.
There are nb2 agents,and the set of agents is denoted by N ¼f 1;2;...;ng.
Let 2K denote the set of all (possibly empty) subsets of K. For subsets of K
consisting of one object,with some abuse of notation,we omit the brackets
and write x instead of fxg. Each agent i A N has a complete and transitive
preference relation Ri over 2K. The associated strict preference relation is de-
noted by Pi. We assume that Ri is strict; that is,for all distinct subsets S;S0 J
K,we have either SPiS0 or S0PiS. Thus, SRiS0 means that either SPiS0 or
S ¼ S0. We further assume that Ri is separable.
An agent’s preferences are separable if he prefers x to nothing if and only
if for any set S not containing x he prefers S Wx to S: for all S JK and all
x A KnS,
xPiq ,ð S WxÞPiS:
Together with strictness and completeness of preferences,this implies that for
all S JK and all x A KnS,
qPix , SPiðS WxÞ:
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and Zhou (1991).
Let R be the set of strict and separable preference relations over 2K.A t
various points in the paper,we will also consider the following three domains
of preferences: the domain of all (unrestricted) strict preferences Ru; the do-
main of strict and additive2 preferences Ra; and the domain of strict,separa-
ble,and responsive 3 preferences Rsr. Clearly, Ra WRsr WRWRu. If not
otherwise stated,we assume that preferences are strict and separable; that is,
R is the default preference domain.4
A preference proﬁle is denoted by R ¼ð R1;R2;...;RnÞ and the set of




Given an ordered collection of objects fx1;x2;...;xmg where mak,
let Lðx1;x2;...;xmÞ be the class of preference relations Ri A R such that
x1Pix2Pi    PixmPiq,and qPiy for all y B fx1;...;xmg. By separability,for
example, fx1;x2;x3gPifx2;x3gPiqPixmþ1 and so on. Note that Ri A LðqÞ
means that qPiy for all y A K; that is,every object is a ‘‘bad’’ for agent i.
Let BðRiÞ¼fx A K : xPiqg be the set of objects that are ‘‘goods’’ for agent i.
By separability, BðRiÞ is the most preferred bundle of objects for agent i.
An allocation is a list ðS1;...;SnÞ such that Si JK for all i A N and Si X
Sj ¼ q for all i0j. The set Si is the (possibly empty) set of objects assigned
to agent i. The second condition simply says that no two agents receive the
same object. Note that we allow free disposal and therefore the union of all
Si’s may be a strict subset of K.
An (assignment) rule is a function j that associates with each preference
proﬁle R A RN an allocation jðRÞ¼ð SiÞiAN. We denote by jiðRÞ the set of
objects assigned to agent i.
A rule j is Pareto e‰cient if it assigns a Pareto e‰cient allocation to each
preference proﬁle; that is,for all R A RN,there is no allocation ðSiÞiAN such
that SiRijiðRÞ for all i A N,with strict preference holding for some j A N.
Separability of preferences and free disposal imply the following:
Lemma 1. If a rule j is Pareto e‰cient, then for all R A RN,
1. jiðRÞJBðRiÞ for all i A N and
2. 6iAN jiðRÞ¼6iAN BðRiÞ.
Proof: Part 1 follows immediately from separability and free disposal. So,
6iAN jiðRÞJ6 iAN BðRiÞ. To prove Part 2,suppose there exists an object









3 An agent’s preferences are responsive if,for any two sets that di¤er only in one object,the agent
prefers the set containing the more preferred object: for all S JK and all x; y A KnS,
xPi y )ð S WxÞPiðS WyÞ:
Roth (1985) introduced the responsiveness of preferences for college admission problems.
4 All results we establish for R remain true on Ra and Rsr.
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is Pareto dominated by the allocation ðSiÞiAN where Sj ¼ jjðRÞWx,and for
all i0j, Si ¼ jiðRÞ.5 r
The following notation will be useful later on. Given R A RN and M JN,
we denote the proﬁle ðRiÞiAM by RM. This is the restriction of R to the set of
agents M. We also use the notation R i ¼ RNnfig.
3. Strategy-proofness
A rule j is strategy-proof if in its associated direct revelation game,it is a
dominant strategy for each agent to report his preferences truthfully; that is,
for all R A RN,all i A N,and all R0
i A R, jðRÞRijðR0
i;R iÞ.
We ﬁrst show that for the two-agent case, strategy-proofness and Pareto
e‰ciency are satisﬁed only by serial dictatorships. The result itself may be of
limited importance since it applies only to the two-person case,but it turns out
to be a key for the remainder of this paper. It will be used in the proofs of
Corollary 1 and Theorems 3 and 4.
Theorem 1. If n ¼ 2, then a rule j is strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient if and
only if it is a serial dictatorship; that is, there exists i A N such that for all
R A RN, jiðRÞ¼BðRiÞ and jjðRÞ¼BðRjÞnBðRiÞ for j 0i.
To get some intuition,consider the case of two goods. A natural way
to achieve Pareto e‰ciency and some degree of equality is to split the set of
objects between the two agents and then let them trade. To be concrete,sup-
pose that we initially assign object x to agent 1 and object y to agent 2,and
then make a Pareto improvement whenever possible. This is not compatible
with strategy-proofness. To see this,suppose that xP1yP1q and xP2qP2y.
Since agent 1 won’t give up x and agent 2 is not interested in y,the ﬁnal
assignment would be ðfx; yg;qÞ. This implies that if we want to maintain
strategy-proofness,we have to give both goods to agent 1 even when agent
1’s preferences are yP0
1xP0
1q. Suppose now that agent 2’s preferences are
xP0
2yP0
2q. Then for ðR0
1;R0
2Þ,the only way to achieve a Pareto improvement
over the initial assignment is to let the agents exchange their objects,and thus
our ﬁnal assignment is ðy;xÞ. But if agent 2 knows this outcome,he would
report R0
2 to obtain x when his true preferences are R2. We now turn to a
formal proof.
Proof: It is easy to check that serial dictatorships are strategy-proof and Par-
eto e‰cient. The proof of the uniqueness part is divided into two steps. Step 1
establishes that,given a strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient rule,each object
‘‘belongs’’ to an agent in the sense that he obtains the object whenever it is
desirable for him. Step 2 shows that in fact all objects ‘‘belong’’ to the same
agent. The desired result then follows immediately from Pareto e‰ciency.
Fix a rule j that is strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient. We say that object x
belongs to agent i if for all R A RN, x A BðRiÞ implies x A jiðRÞ.
5 It is easy to see that the converse of Lemma 1 is false.
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Let N ¼f 1;2g and ﬁx x A K. Let R0
1 A LðxÞ and R0
2 A LðxÞ be such that for
all i A f1;2g,
ðS WxÞP0
i q for all S JK: ð1Þ
This is the case if object x is su‰ciently desirable for each agent.6 By Pareto
e‰ciency, x A jiðR0Þ for some i A f1;2g. Without loss of generality,assume
i ¼ 1. Then,by Pareto e‰ciency, jðR0Þ¼ð x;qÞ. We show that object x be-
longs to agent 1.
Take any R2 A R. Strategy-proofness implies qR0
2j2ðR0
1;R2Þ. Then (1)
implies that x B j2ðR0
1;R2Þ.B yPareto e‰ciency,it follows that
j1ðR0
1;R2Þ¼x for all R2 A R: ð2Þ
Suppose,by contradiction,that there exists R A RN such that x A BðR1Þ
and x B j1ðRÞ. Let jðRÞ¼ð S1;S2Þ. Note that by Pareto e‰ciency, x A S2.
Let R2 A R be such that BðR2Þ¼S2. Strategy-proofness implies j2ðR1;R2Þ
R2S2. Since BðR2Þ¼S2,we have j2ðR1;R2Þ¼S2. Thus by Pareto e‰ciency,
jðR1;R2Þ¼ð S1;S2Þ: ð3Þ
Let R1 A R be such that BðR1Þ¼S1 Wx and xP1S1. This is the case if ob-
ject x is su‰ciently desirable for agent 1.7 By Pareto e‰ciency, S1 Jj1ðRÞ
since agent 2 is not interested in any object in S1. Thus j1ðRÞ is either S1 or
S1 Wx. Strategy-proofness implies
j1ðRÞR1j1ðR0
1;R2Þ¼xP1S1;
where the equality follows from (2). This implies j1ðRÞ¼S1 Wx. Strategy-
proofness then implies
j1ðR1;R2ÞR1ðS1 WxÞ:
By (3),this means S1R1ðS1 WxÞ,which is in contradiction with x A BðR1Þ.
Step 2. All objects belong to the same agent.
Suppose,to the contrary,that object x belongs to agent 1 and object y
belongs to agent 2. Let R1 A Lðy;xÞ and R2 A Lðx; yÞ. Then x A j1ðRÞ and
y A j2ðRÞ,which is in violation of Pareto e‰ciency. r
Pa ´pai (2000b) shows that the class of strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient
assignment rules that assign at most one object to each agent contains what
she calls ﬁxed endowment hierarchical exchange rules. One characteristic of
these rules is that some agents receive some of the objects as initial endow-
ments. The ﬁnal allocation is determined by a sequential process of trading
6 Let K ¼f x1;...;xkg and assume x ¼ xk. Then, R0
i can be represented by the following additive
utility function: uiðxkÞ¼10k and uiðxlÞ¼  10l for all l0k.
7 Similarly as before,let K ¼f x1;...;xkg and assume x ¼ xk. Then, R1 can be represented by the
following additive utility function: u1ðxlÞ¼10l if xl A S1 Wfxkg and uðxlÞ¼  10l otherwise.
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with initial endowments can only improve their allocation; that is,their
‘‘minimal right’’ to the endowments is respected. We prove that when an agent
may desire multiple objects, strategy-proofness and Pareto e‰ciency exclude
that minimal rights be assigned to more than one agent.
Let x A K. We say that a rule j respects the minimal right of agent i for
object x if for all R A RN, jiðRÞRix. A rule j respects minimal rights for agent i
if there exists x A K such that j respects the minimal right of i for x. The fol-
lowing result holds for any nb2.
Corollary 1. A strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient rule respects minimal rights
for at most one agent.
Proof: Suppose,by contradiction,that j respects minimal rights for agents 1
and 2. For i B f1;2g,let ^ R Ri A LðqÞ. Let g be the function on Rf1;2g deﬁned by
gðR1;R2Þ¼ð j1ðR1;R2; ^ R R3;...; ^ R RnÞ;j2ðR1;R2; ^ R R3;...; ^ R RnÞÞ: ð4Þ
So, g1ðR1;R2Þ is the set of objects assigned to agent 1 when the proﬁle is
ðR1;R2; ^ R R3;...; ^ R RnÞ. Note that jiðR1;R2; ^ R R3;...; ^ R RnÞ is an empty set for all
i B f1;2g. Thus g is a rule for two-agent economies,and it is strategy-proof
and Pareto e‰cient. Thus by Theorem 1, g is a serial dictatorship. But then
g does not respect minimal rights for the second dictator,and neither does
j. r
In the slightly di¤erent context where agents are initially endowed with
the objects and a rule j reallocates the objects among them,Corollary 1 can
be interpreted as an impossibility result that is also obtained by So ¨nmez
(1999): there exists no rule that satisﬁes strategy-proofness, Pareto e‰ciency,
and individual-rationality8.
Example 1. There exists a strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient rule that does not
respect minimal rights for any agent. To see this,let N ¼f 1;2;3g and K ¼





This rule is strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient simply because agents choose
objects sequentially and the agent who determines the sequence always chooses
last. Note that it is strategy-proof for agent 3 since he obtains BðR3ÞnðBðR1ÞW
BðR2ÞÞ,regardless of the sequence. The rule does not respect minimal rights
for anyone since no one can obtain an object for sure when it is a ‘‘good’’ for
him.
Remark 1: Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 also hold if we restrict preferences to
the domain of strict,separable,and responsive preferences ( Rsr) or the domain
of strict and additive preferences (Ra). For Ra,we added some additive utility
8 Individual-rationality means that no agent is worse o¤ after the reallocation of the objects.
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can be adjusted. A standard argument establishes that Theorem 1 and Corol-
lary 1 also hold on the domain of all strict preferences (Ru).9
4. Solidarity
4.1. Replacement-domination
The ﬁrst ‘‘solidarity’’ property we discuss is welfare-domination under
preference-replacement,or replacement-domination for short. It incorporates a
notion of solidarity among agents when a single agent changes his preference
relation; that is,if an agent’s preference relation is replaced by another pref-
erence relation,then,after this change,either all remaining agents are (weakly)
better o¤ or they all are (weakly) worse o¤.10
Formally,a rule j satisﬁes replacement-domination if for all R A RN,all
i A N,and all R0
i A R,
either ½for all j A Nnfig;jjðRÞRjjjðR0
i;R iÞ 
or ½for all j A Nnfig;jjðR0
i;R iÞRjjjðRÞ :
It turns out that for more than two agents, replacement-domination and
Pareto e‰ciency are not compatible.11
Theorem 2. If there exist three or more agents (i.e., nb3), then there exists no
rule j that satisﬁes replacement-domination and Pareto e‰ciency.
Proof: Without loss of generality,assume that N ¼f 1;2;3g. Choose any ob-




N.12 There are exactly three Pareto e‰-
cient allocations for this proﬁle: ðx;q;qÞ, ðq;x;qÞ,and ðq;q;xÞ. With-












3Þ.B yPareto e‰ciency,object y goes to agent 1. Also
by Pareto e‰ciency,object x goes to either agent 2 or agent 3. Without loss of
generality,assume that it goes to agent 2. Then,
9 On the general domain of strict preferences,the formal deﬁnition of serial dictatorship must be
modiﬁed slightly. The reason is that after agent i picks BðRiÞ,the most preferred bundle for j is
not necessarily BðRjÞnBðRiÞ.
10 Moulin (1987) introduced replacement-domination in the context of binary choice with quasi-
linear preferences. Replacement-domination has been studied in a variety of settings and we refer
the interested reader to a recent review of the literature by Thomson (1999).
11 Note that for assignment problems with only one object, replacement-domination and Pareto
e‰ciency are compatible. It follows from a result by Klaus,Peters,and Storcken (1997) that
the class of assignment rules for one-object assignment problems satisfying strategy-proofness,
replacement-domination,and Pareto e‰ciency equals the class of serial dictatorships.
12 If n > 3,choose three agents,and consider R where Ri A LðxÞ for these agents and Ri A LðqÞ
for the others. We can ignore the agents with Ri A LðqÞ since they receive no object.





Now,change agent 2’s preferences to R
y






By Pareto e‰ciency,agent 3 receives object x,and so he gains. Thus,agent 1







Now,change agent 1’s preferences back to Rx





By Pareto e‰ciency,agent 2 receives object y,and so he gains. Thus,agent 3





3Þ¼ð q; y;xÞ: ð8Þ




2,agent 1 loses while agent 3 gains,a contradiction. r
Remark 2: Theorem 2 also holds on Ra, Rsr,and Ru. The theorem also ap-
plies to the assignment problem where each agent is allowed to receive at most
one object (see assignment models described in Pa ´pai (2000b) and Svensson
(1999)).
4.2. Population-monotonicity
So far,the set of agents has been ﬁxed. In this section,we consider a model
with a variable population. Let P ¼f 1;...; pg, pb3,be a ﬁnite set of po-
tential agents. We denote by P the set of nonempty subsets of P.Arule is now
a function j that associates with each set of agents N A P and each preference
proﬁle R A RN an allocation jðRÞ¼ð SiÞiAN.
Our main property in this section is population-monotonicity,which incor-
porates a notion of solidarity among agents when changes in the population
occur; that is,if a group of agents leave,then,after this change,either all re-
maining agents are (weakly) better o¤ or they all are (weakly) worse o¤.13
Formally,a rule j is population-monotonic if for all N A P,all R A RN,
and all M JN,
either ½for all i A M;jiðRMÞRijiðRÞ 
or ½for all i A M;jiðRÞRijiðRMÞ :
Recall that RM is the restriction of R to the set of agents M. This condition
says that if the agents outside M leave,then the agents in M should gain to-
gether or lose together. The idea is that no one in M is responsible for the
departure of NnM,and thus it makes sense to require that the welfare of the
agents M change at least in the same direction.
The following lemma states that under Pareto e‰ciency,we can ignore the
13 Population-monotonicity is introduced by Thomson (1983a,b) in the context of bargaining. An
excellent survey on this axiom is Thomson (1995).
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its proof since it is standard in the literature.
Lemma 2. Let j be a population-monotonic and Pareto e‰cient rule. If N A P,
R A RN, and M JN, then for all i A M, jiðRMÞRijiðRÞ.
This result is intuitive since the departure of agents is globally beneﬁcial for
the remaining group. The objects are now allocated among fewer agents,and
thus it makes sense to require a (weak) Pareto improvement for the remaining
agents.
We characterize the class of rules that are strategy-proof, population-
monotonic,and Pareto e‰cient. It turns out that these properties are satisﬁed
only by serial dictatorships. By a serial dictatorship,we mean that there is a
ranking of the set of potential agents, P,such that the agent with the highest
ranking among those actually present chooses his best set of objects,then the
agent with the next highest ranking chooses his best set of objects among the
remaining objects,and so on.
Serial Dictatorship: Let p be a permutation on P.14 Then the serial dicta-
torship with respect to p is deﬁned as follows. Given a set of agents N ¼















For example,suppose that pðiÞ1i, N ¼f 2;4;5g, BðR2Þ¼f 1;2;3g, BðR4Þ¼
f3;4;5g,and BðR5Þ¼f 2;3;5;6;7g. Then agent 2 obtains f1;2;3g,agent 4
obtains f4;5g,and agent 5 obtains f6;7g.
Theorem 3. A rule j is strategy-proof, population-monotonic, and Pareto e‰-
cient if and only if it is a serial dictatorship.
Proof: It is easy to verify that any serial dictatorship satisﬁes the properties
named in the theorem; the proof is left to the reader. Serial dictatorships do
not satisfy population-monotonicity when we allow for non-separable prefer-
ences; see Example 2 below.
To prove the uniqueness part,let j be a rule satisfying the properties named
in the theorem. We know from Theorem 1 that in two-agent economies, j is a
14 That is, p is a one-to-one function from P to P.
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economies with agents i and j.
We ﬁrst show that   produces no cycle. To see this,suppose that 1   2,








3Þ¼ð x;q;qÞ. Since 3   1,we have jðRx
1;Rx
3Þ¼
ðq;xÞ. This means that when agent 2 leaves,agent 1 loses while agent 3 gains,
a contradiction.
This shows that   produces a strict ranking over the set of potential agents
P. Let p be the permutation deﬁned by pðiÞ < pðjÞ,i   j. We show that j is
the serial dictatorship with respect to p.
Take any N A P and R A RN. We ﬁrst claim that for all i; j A N,
i   j ) jjðRÞXBðRiÞ¼q: ð9Þ
That is,if i   j,then agent j does not receive any object that is ‘‘good’’ for
agent i. To prove this,let R0





j;R jÞ¼jjðRÞ. Suppose now
that agents Nnfi; jg leave. Since agent j should not lose, jjðRi;R0
jÞ¼jjðRÞ.
Since i   j,we have jiðRi;R0
jÞ¼BðRiÞ,which establishes (9).
Now,denote N ¼f i1;i2;...;iqg where i1   i2      iq. Then (9) implies
that no one in fi2;...;iqg receives objects in BðRi1Þ. This,together with Pareto
e‰ciency,implies that agent i1 receives BðRi1Þ. Similarly,no one in fi3;...;iqg
receives objects in BðRi1ÞWBðRi2Þ. Since agent i1 receives BðRi1Þ and j is Par-
eto e‰cient,it follows that agent i2 receives BðRi2ÞnBðRi1Þ. It is easy to see
how this argument applies for the remaining agents. r
Theorem 3 also holds on domains Rsr and Ra. However,it does not hold
on Ru,as the following example shows.
Example 2. Let K ¼f x; yg, P ¼f 1;2;3g,and pðiÞ1i. Let j denote the serial
dictatorship that corresponds to p; that is,agent 1 is the ﬁrst dictator,agent 2
the second dictator and agent 3 chooses last.15 Let R ¼ð R1;R2;R3Þ be such
that R1 A LðxÞ, R3 A LðyÞ,and fx; ygP2xP2qP2y. Then jðRÞ¼ð x;q; yÞ and
jðR2;R3Þ¼f f x; yg;qg. Hence,when agent 1 leaves,agent 2 gains and
agent 3 loses.
Corollary 2. Suppose that there exist at least three potential agents (i.e., jPjb
3). Then on the general domain of strict preferences Ru, there exists no rule that
is strategy-proof, population-monotonic, and Pareto e‰cient.
5. Consistency
Our last property of rules is a condition of stability. To understand this con-
dition,suppose that after objects are allocated according to a rule,some agents
leave the economy with their allotments,and the remaining agents ‘‘renego-
tiate’’ among themselves the assignment of the remaining objects. What if
15 As in the two-person case,the formal deﬁnition of serial dictatorship has to be adjusted on the
general domain of strict preferences.
Multiple assignment problems 431the same rule is applied to their ‘‘renegotiation problem’’? The rule might be
considered ‘‘unstable’’ or ‘‘inconsistent’’ if its assignment to the renegotiating
agents di¤er from its original assignment to them.
The condition of consistency has been formulated in a variety of economic
and game-theoretic contexts.16 Thus it is interesting to see what solution con-
cepts are characterized by consistency in our context.
To formulate consistency,we have to consider a model where both the set
of agents and the set of objects are variable. Let O ¼f 1;...;og be a ﬁnite set
of potential objects. We denote by O the set of all non-empty subsets of O.
Preferences Ri are deﬁned over 2O.Arule is now a function j that associates
with each N A P,each R A RN,and each K A O an allocation jðR;KÞ where
6iAN jiðR;KÞJK. Here jiðR;KÞ denotes the set of objects that agent i re-
ceives when the set of available objects is K.
A rule j is consistent if for all K A O,all N A P,all R A RN,all M JN,






The right-hand side is the outcome when j is reapplied to reallocating the ob-
jects received by the agents M to themselves. This condition says that such a
‘‘renegotiation’’ does not change the outcome for the agents in M.
We use the notation BðRi;KÞ¼BðRiÞXK. This is the set of ‘‘good’’ ob-
jects in K.
It turns out,that consistency together with strategy-proofness and Pareto
e‰ciency implies serial dictatorships.
Serial Dictatorship: Let p be a permutation on P. Then the serial dictator-
ship with respect to p is deﬁned as follows. When an economy consists of
agents N ¼f n1;...;nngJP such that pðn1Þ < pðn2Þ <    < pðnnÞ,their pref-














Theorem 4. A rule j is strategy-proof, consistent, and Pareto e‰cient if and
only if it is a serial dictatorship.
16 Consistency is a key property of a number of major solution concepts in economics and game
theory. Examples include Walrasian equilibrium,Nash bargaining solution,core,nucleolus,
Shapley value,and Nash equilibrium. An exhaustive survey on consistency is Thomson (1996).
432 B. Klaus,E. MiyagawaProof: It is easy to check that any serial dictatorship satisﬁes the properties
named in the theorem; the proof is left to the reader.
To prove the uniqueness part,let j be a rule satisfying the properties
named in the theorem. Consider the two-person economies with agents i and j
where the set of available objects is K A O. We know that within these econo-
mies, j is a serial dictatorship (Theorem 1). We write i  K j if agent i is the
ﬁrst dictator.
We ﬁrst show that i  O j implies that i  K j for all K A O. To see this,
suppose that BðRiÞ¼BðRjÞ¼K. Since i  O j, jðRi;Rj;OÞ¼ð K;qÞ.B y
consistency, jðRi;Rj;KÞ¼ð K;qÞ. This implies that when the set of available
objects is K,agent j is not the ﬁrst dictator,and thus the ﬁrst dictator is
agent i. From now on,we write i   j whenever i  O j.
We next show that   produces no cycle. To see this,suppose that 1   2,












This contradicts 3  x 1.
This shows that   produces a strict ranking over the set of agents P. Let p
be the permutation on P deﬁned by pðiÞ < pðjÞ,i   j. We show that j is the
serial dictatorship with respect to p.




where the second equality follows from i   j. It follows that jjðR;KÞX
BðRiÞ¼q if i   j.
Now,denote N ¼f i1;i2;...;iqg where i1   i2      iq. Since no one in
fi2;...;iqg receives objects in BðRi1Þ, Pareto e‰ciency implies that agent i1
receives BðRi1;KÞ. Similarly,since no one in fi3;...;iqg receives objects in
BðRi1ÞWBðRi2Þ and agent i1 receives BðRi1;KÞ, Pareto e‰ciency implies that
agent i2 receives BðRi2;KÞnBðRi1;KÞ. It is easy to see how this argument ap-
plies for the remaining agents in N. r
Remark 3: Theorem 4 also holds on Rsr, Ra,and Ru.17
6. Independence of the axioms
We conclude with the independence of the axioms in Theorems 1,3,and 4.
Example 3. Consider the rule that does not allocate the objects at all:
jiðR;KÞ1q. This rule is obviously strategy-proof, population-monotonic,
consistent,and not Pareto e‰cient.
17 As before,the formal deﬁnition of serial dictatorship must be modiﬁed on the domain Ru.
Multiple assignment problems 433Example 4. The following rule is strategy-proof and Pareto e‰cient,while it is
neither population-monotonic nor consistent. For N ¼f i1;...;ing, j is the
‘‘sequential’’ dictatorship where the ﬁrst dictator is agent i1 and,for all k A





That is,the order in which agents can choose their bundles after agent i1 de-
pends on the preferences of agent i1.
The class of sequential dictatorships is a superset of the class of serial dic-
tatorships that allows for certain changes in the sequence of dictators depend-
ing on the choices that previous dictators make; see Ehlers and Klaus (2000).
Example 5. The following rule is population-monotonic, consistent,and Pareto
e‰cient,but it is not strategy-proof. Let N ¼f i1;...;ing be such that i1 <
i2 <    < in.I fK ¼ O and BðRi;OÞ¼O for some i A N,then jjðR;OÞ¼O
where j ¼ argminfi : BðRi;OÞ¼Og. Otherwise, j is the serial dictatorship
where the k-th dictator is ik.
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